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DISTANCE RATIONALIZATION OF ANONYMOUS AND HOMOGENEOUS VOTING RULES
BENJAMIN HADJIBEYLI ANDMARK C. WILSON
ABSTRACT. The concept of distance rationalizability of voting rules has been explored in recent years
by several authors. Roughly speaking, we first choose a consensus set of elections (defined via prefer-
ences of voters over candidates) for which the result is specified a priori (intuitively, these are elec-
tions on which all voters can easily agree on the result). We also choose a measure of distance be-
tween elections. The result of an election outside the consensus set is defined to be the result of the
closest consensual election under the distancemeasure.
Most previous work has dealt with a definition in terms of preference profiles. However, most
voting rules in common use are anonymous and homogeneous. In this case there is a much more
succinct representation (using the voting simplex) of the inputs to the rule. This representation has
been widely used in the voting literature, but rarely in the context of distance rationalizability.
We show exactly how to connect distance rationalizability on profiles for anonymous and homo-
geneous rules to geometry in the simplex. We develop the connection for the important special case
of votewise distances, recently introduced and studied by Elkind, Faliszewski and Slinko in several
papers. This yields a direct interpretation in terms of well-developed mathematical concepts not
seen before in the voting literature, namely Kantorovich (also called Wasserstein) distances and the
geometry of Minkowski spaces.
As an application of this approach, we prove some positive and some negative results about the
decisiveness of distance rationalizable anonymous and homogeneous rules. The positive results
connect with the recent theory of hyperplane rules, while the negative ones deal with distances that
are notmetrics, controversial notions of consensus, and the fact that the ℓ1-norm is not strictly con-
vex.
We expect that the above novel geometric interpretation will aid the analysis of rules defined by
votewise distances, and the discovery of new rules with desirable properties.
1. INTRODUCTION
Weare interested in the relationbetween twoways of describing voting rules (interpretedbroadly),
each of which has a geometric flavour.
The class of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules includes all rules used in practice, and
most rules appearing in the research literature (Dodgson’s rule is a notable exception). For such
rules there is an obvious concise way to describe an input profile of preferences, using the vote
simplex. This approach goes back at least as far as Young [23] and was extensively developed and
popularized by Saari [17]. By allowing us to use geometric intuition, it aids in the analysis of many
properties of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules.
The framework of distance rationalizability is a useful way to organize the huge number of vot-
ing rules that have been introduced. By decomposing a rule into a consensus and a notion of dis-
tance to that consensus, the framework allows systematic derivation of axiomatic properties of the
rule from those of its components. This kind of analysis has been carried out recently by Elkind,
Faliszewski and Slinko [5, 6] and the present authors [8], following early work by Campbell, Lerer
and Nitzan [16, 11, 1] andMeskanen and Nurmi [14].
Until now, the two approaches described above have not been explicitly connected. Specific
distance-based rules have indeedbeen studied in the simplex or permutahedron, notably byZwicker
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[26, 25, 3]. However, a more general approach is lacking. As shown in [8], the theory can be de-
veloped simultaneously for social choice rules and social welfare rules, and for very general dis-
tances and consensus notions, in a way that clarifies the relationship between the profile-based
and simplex-based representations.
1.1. Outline of paper and our contribution. In Section 2 we cover the basic notation and termi-
nology. A rule defined directly on the simplex is automatically anonymous and homogeneous.
Conversely, every anonymous and homogeneous rule can instead be defined on the simplex. In
Section 3 we show how the usual distance rationalizability approach on profiles connects with the
geometric approach on the vote simplex.
The methods of Zwicker and Saari, starting with the simplex or related geometric representa-
tions of the space of preference profiles and using usual Euclidean geometry, have led both to the
discovery of some new anonymous and homogeneous rules and to improved analysis of some old
ones. We give an example in Proposition 3.11 of some new rules defined in an intuitive way. How-
ever, as it seems that in order to find more interesting rules we must dig deeper and use less well-
known consensuses or distances, we focus instead on the analysis of rules defined on profile space,
using our geometric machinery.
Startingwith an anonymous and homogeneous rule defined via distance rationalization on pro-
file space, we consider the corresponding rule on the simplex and interpret it geometrically. Ab-
stractly, this is straightforward if we use a quotient distance, a general construction which is non-
trivial to compute in general. However, in the situation of the present paper, we can give simple
explicit formulae (Proposition 3.15). We focus in Section 3.3 on the special case of ℓp-votewise
distances, which have been shown by Elkind, Faliszweski and Slinko (and the present authors) to
have many desirable properties. We sharpen further the description above to show that in this
case, the quotient distance on the simplex is a Wasserstein (also called Kantorovich) distance, a
concept widely used in probability theory and its applications in computer science. In particu-
lar when p = 1 (the most natural case for voting) each such distance is induced by a norm, and we
can interpret everything in terms of the geometry of finite-dimensional normed spaces (also called
Minkowski spaces). This provides a new perspective to the voting literature and suggests not only
new voting rules defined using geometric intuition, but also a new geometric tool for the analysis
of existing rules.
In particular, in Section 4 we use the simplex representation to explore the decisiveness (how
often it gives a unique winner) of a distance rationalizable rule. On the positive side, we give a
sufficient condition in Corollary 6.9 for a rule to be a hyperplane rule and thus admit a vanishingly
small fraction of profiles where ties occur. For example, any rule defined using an ℓp-votewise
distance and the strong or weak unanimity consensus satisfies this condition. On the negative
side, we show in Proposition 5.1 that ties can occur in a large fraction of profile space if we use
ℓ1-votewise metrics, unless the notion of consensus is very well chosen. This sheds light on some
common consensus notions and casts some doubt on that of Condorcet. In Section 7 we make
some recommendations for desirable properties of consensus sets and distances.
The approach adopted here and in [8], following [6], allows for systematic exploration of the
space of aggregation rules and the construction of rules with guaranteed axiomatic properties. We
expect that more insight into distance-based voting rules will be obtained by exploiting the deeper
geometric connections developed here.
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS
We use standard concepts of social choice theory. Not all of these concepts have completely
standardized names.
Definition2.1. Wefixafinite setC = {c1,c2, . . . ,cm} of candidatesandan infinite setV
∗ = {v1,v2, . . . , }
of potential voters. For each s with 1≤ s ≤m, an s-ranking is a strict linear order of s elements cho-
sen fromC. The set of all s-rankings is denoted Ls(C ). When s =m we write simply L(C ). When s = 1
we identify L1(C ) withC in the natural way.
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Definition 2.2. A profile is a function π :V → L(C ) where V ⊂ V ∗ is finite. We denote the set of all
profiles with fixed C and V by P (C ,V ) and the set of all profiles by P (C ). An election is a triple
(C ,V ,π) with π ∈P (C ,V ). We denote the set of all elections with fixed C and V by E (C ,V ), and the
class of all elections by E .
Definition 2.3. A social rule of size s is a function R that takes each election E = (C ,V ,π) to a
nonempty subset of Ls(C ). When there is a unique s-ranking chosen, the word “rule" becomes “func-
tion". When s = 1, we have the usual social choice function, and when s = |C | the usual social
welfare function.
For each subsetD of E we can consider apartial social rulewith domainD to be defined as above,
but with domain restricted to D.
2.1. Consensus. Intuitively, a consensus is simply a socially agreed unique outcome on some set
of elections. We now define it formally.
Definition 2.4. An s-consensus is a partial social function K of size s. The domain D(K ) of K is
called an s-consensus set and is partitioned into the inverse images Kr :=K
−1({r }).
Several specific consensuses have been described in the literature. We list a few important ones.
Some have been discussed by previous authors only in the case s = 1 but the definitions extend
naturally.
Definition 2.5. We use the following consensuses in this article.
• We denote by Ss the consensus K for which Kr is the election in which all voters agree that
r is the ranking of the top s candidates. When s = |C |, we simply write S (called the strong
unanimity consensus), whereaswhen s= 1, for consistencywith previous authors we denote
itW, the weak unanimity consensus.
• The 1-Condorcet consensus C has domain consisting of all elections for which a Condorcet
winner exists. That is, there is a candidate c (the Condorcet winner) such that for every other
candidate b a fraction strictly greater than 1/2 of voters rank c above b.
2.2. Distances. We require a notion of distance on elections. We aim to be as general as possible.
Definition 2.6. (distance) A distance (or hemimetric) on E is a function d : E ×E →R+∪ {∞} that
satisfies for all x, y,z ∈ E
• d (x,x)= 0,
• d (x,z)≤ d (x, y)+d (y,z).
Apseudometric is a distance that also satisfies d(x, y)= d (y,x). Aquasimetric is a distance that also
satisfiesd (x, y)= 0⇒ x = y. Ametric is a distance that is both a quasimetricand a pseudometric. We
call a distance standard if d (E ,E ′)=∞whenever E and E ′ have different sets of voters or candidates.
One commonly used class of distances consists of the votewise distances [6] (Definition 2.11
below). First we require some preliminary definitions.
Example 2.7. (commonly used distances on L(C )) We discuss the following distances on L(C ) in this
article.
• The discrete metric dH , defined by
dH (ρ,ρ
′)=
{
1 if ρ = ρ′
0 otherwise.
• The inversionmetricdK (also called the swap, bubblesort or Kendall-τmetric),where dK (ρ,σ)
is the minimum number of swaps of adjacent elements needed to change ρ into σ.
• Spearman’s footrule dS , defined by
dS(ρ,ρ
′) :=
∑
c∈C
|rk(ρ,c)− rk(ρ′,c)|.
Here rk(ρ,c) denotes the rank of c in the preference order ρ.
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Definition 2.8. A seminorm on a real vector space X is a real-valued function N satisfying the iden-
tities
• N (x+ y)≤N (x)+N (y)
• N (λx)= |λ|N (x)
for all x, y ∈ X and all λ ∈R. Note that this implies that N (0)= 0 and N (x)≥ 0 for all x ∈ X .
A norm is a seminorm that also satisfies
• N (x)= 0⇒ x = 0.
Remark 2.9. Every seminorm induces a pseudometric via d (x, y)= ||x− y ||. This is a metric if and
only if the seminorm is a norm.
Example 2.10. Consider an n-dimensional space X with fixed basis e1, . . . ,en and corresponding
coefficients xi for each element x ∈ X . Fix p with 1≤ p <∞ and define the ℓ
p-norm on X by
||x||p =
(
n∑
i=1
|xi |
p
)1/p
.
When p =∞we define the ℓ∞ norm by
||x||∞ = max
1≤i≤n
|xi |.
Definition 2.11. (votewise distances)
Fix a candidate set C and voter set V , and a distance d on L(C ). Choose a family {Nn}n≥1 of
seminorms, where Nn is defined on R
n . Extend d to a function on P (C ,V ) by taking n = |V | and
defining for σ,π ∈P (C ,V )
dNn (π,σ) :=Nn(d (π1,σ1), . . . ,d (πn ,σn)).
This yields a distance on elections having the same set of voters and candidates. We complete the
definition of the extended distance (which we denote by dN ) on E by declaring it to be standard.
We use the abbreviation dp for dℓ
p
, and sometimes we even use just d for dN if the meaning is
clear.
Remark 2.12. Note that if d is a metric and N is a norm, then dN is a metric.
Example 2.13. (famous votewise distances) The distances d1H and d
1
K are called respectively the
Hamming metric and Kemeny metric. The Hamming metric measures the minimum number of
voters whose preferences must be changed in order to convert one profile to another, and as such
has an interpretation in terms of unit cost bribery [7]. The Kemeny metric measures the minimum
number of swaps of adjacent candidates required to convert one profile to another, and is related to
models of voter error [24].
Example 2.14. (tournament distances) Given an election E = (C ,V ,π), we form the pairwise tour-
nament digraph Γ(E ) with nodes indexed by the candidates, where the arc from a to b has weight
equal to the net support for a over b in a pairwise contest. Formally, there is an arc from a to b whose
weight equals nab−nba , where nab denotes the number of rankings in π in which a is above b.
Let M (E ) be the weighted adjacency matrix of Γ(E ) (with respect to an arbitrarily chosen fixed
ordering of C). Given a seminorm N on the space of all |C | × |C | real matrices, we define the N-
tournament distance by
dN (E ,E ′)=N (M (E )−M (E ′)).
A closely related distance is defined in a similar way, but where each element of the adjacencyma-
trix is replaced by its sign (1, 0, or −1). We call this the N-reduced tournament distance. We denote
the special cases where N is the ℓ1 norm on matrices by dT and dRT respectively. Every (reduced)
tournament distance is a pseudometric.
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2.3. Combining consensus and distance. In order for a rule to be definable via the DR construc-
tion, it is necessary that the following property holds, and we shall assume this from now on.
Definition 2.15. Let d be a distance andK a consensus. We say that (K ,d ) distinguishes consen-
sus choices if whenever x ∈Kr , y ∈Kr ′ and r 6= r
′, then d (x, y)> 0.
We use a distance to extend a consensus to a social rule in the natural way. The choice at a given
election E consists of all s-rankings r whose consensus set Kr minimizes the distance to E . We
introduce the idea of a score in order to use our intuition about positional scoring rules.
Definition 2.16. (DR scores and rules)
Suppose thatK is an s-consensusand d a distance on E . Fix an electionE ∈ E . For each r ∈ Ls(C ),
the (K ,d ,E )-score of r is defined by
|r | := d (E ,Kr ) := inf
E ′∈Kr
d (E ,E ′).
The rule R :=R(K ,d ) is defined by
(1) R(E )= arg min
r∈Ls (C )
|r |.
We say that R is distance rationalizable (DR) with respect to (K ,d ).
Example 2.17. (scoring rules) The positional scoring rule defined by a vector w of weights with
w1 ≥ ·· · ≥ wm and w1 > wm elects all candidates with maximum score, where the score of a in the
profile π is defined as
∑
v∈V wrk(π(v),a).
The plurality (w = (1,0,0, . . . ,0)) and Borda (w = (m−1,m−2, . . . ,0)) rules arewell-known special
cases.
The positional scoring rule defined by w has the form R(W,d1S(w)) where dS(w) is the generaliza-
tion of dS given by
dS(w)(ρ,ρ
′)=
∑
c∈C
|wrk(ρ,c)−wrk(ρ′,c)|.
[6, Prop. 8]. Thus the Borda rule can be expressed as R(W,d1S ).
Also, the positional scoring rule defined by w has the form R(W,d1
K (w)
) where dK (w) is a general-
ized swap distance on rankings [11]. Borda’s rule has the form R(W,d1K ).
Remark 2.18. Note that dw is a metric on Ls(C ) if and only if w1, . . . ,ws are all distinct. The score of
r under the rule defined by w is the difference nw1−|r |. For example, for Borda with m candidates
the maximum possible score of a candidate c is (m − 1)n, achieved only for those elections in Wc .
Note that as far as the distance toW or C is concerned, d1S and d
1
K are proportional, but they are not
proportional in general [14, p. 298–299]. The score of c under Borda is exactly n(m−1)−K where
K is the total number of swaps of adjacent candidates needed to move c to the top of all preference
orders in π(E ).
Example 2.19. (Copeland’s rule) Copeland’s rule can be represented as R(C,dRT ). Indeed, in an
election E, the Copeland score of a candidate c (the number of points it scores in pairwise contests
with other candidates) equals n−1−s, where s is theminimumnumber of pairwise results thatmust
be changed for E to change to an election that belongs to Cc .
3. SIMPLEX RULES
Although it is far from the general case, most rules used in practice are in fact anonymous and
homogeneous. In this case there is an appealing geometric interpretation. The frequency distribu-
tion of votes is sufficient information to determine the output of the rule, and so profile space can
be substantially compressed.
We have previously explored in detail the connection with distance rationalization [8]. We first
recall the construction for anonymous rules. Recall that amultiset of weight n on an underlying
set S of size M is “a set of n elements of S with repetitions". Formally, there is a function f : S→N
where f (s) gives the multiplicity of s in the multiset.
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Definition 3.1. Let E = (C ,V ,π) ∈ E . The vote numbermapN is themap that associates E with the
multisetN (E ) on L(C ) of weight |V |, in which themultiplicity of ρ ∈ L(C ) is the number of voters in
V having that preference order.
A rule R is anonymous if R(E )=R(E ′)wheneverN (E )=N (E ′). We denote the quotient space by
V and call it the set of anonymous profiles.
Remark 3.2. N (E ) simply keeps track of the numbers of votes of each type in π, ignoring the identi-
ties of voters. A rule is anonymous if this information is enough to determine the output. The more
usual (and equivalent) definition of anonymity is given in Remark 3.5 below.
Definition 3.3. The vote distribution associated to E is the relative frequency distribution on L(C )
corresponding to the multiset N (E ), which we denote D(E ). Explicitly, D is a function from E to
[0,1]L(C ), which gives for each ranking the proportion of voters having this ranking as preference.
The vote distribution map defines an equivalence relation ∼ on E in the usual way: E ∼ E ′ if and
only if D(E )=D(E ′).
An anonymous rule R is homogeneous if R(E ) = R(E ′) whenever D(E ) = D(E ′). We denote the
quotient space by F , and call it the set of anonymous and homogeneous profiles.
Remark 3.4. Note that if E = (C ,V ,π),E ′ = (C ,V ′,π′) ∈ E and N (E )=N (E ′), then |V | = |V ′|. Thus
there is a well-definedmap f : V →F (“divide by the number of voters"), and D(E ) simply lists each
preference order according to its relative frequency in π.
Remark 3.5. Anonymous and homogeneous rules were already defined in the literature, but in dif-
ferent ways.
Let g be a permutation of V ∗. For each E = (C ,V ,π), define g (E )= (C ,g (V ),g (π))where g (π)(v)=
π(g (v)). A rule R is anonymous if and only if R(g (E ))=R(E ) for all E ∈ E and all g .
For k ≥ 1, define kE to be an election (C ,kV ,kπ) where kV consists of k copies of each voter in V
and kπ the corresponding copies of their preference orders (the exact order of the voters is irrelevant
since we deal only with anonymous rules). An anonymous rule R is homogeneous if and only if
R(kE )=R(E ) for all E ∈ E and all k.
We call anonymous and homogeneous rules simplex rules for short, and now explain why. So
far the discussion has been coordinate-free, but it is often useful to introduce coordinates. Given
any linear orderingρ1,ρ2, . . . ,ρM on L(C ), where |C | =m andM =m!, we can introduce coordinates
xi such that xi denotes the relative frequency associated to ρi . The set of frequency distributions
∆
Q(L(C )) is then coordinatized by the rational points of the standard simplex.
Definition 3.6. The standard simplex in RM is the set
∆M :=
{
x ∈RM |
∑
i
xi = 1,xi ≥ 0 for 1≤ i ≤M
}
.
We let ∆
Q
M
:=QM ∩∆M denote the rational points of ∆M .
Remark 3.7. For simplicity we sometimes write xt for the component of x ∈ ∆M corresponding to
t ∈ L(C ) (instead of xi where i is the number of t in some linear ordering on L(C )).
Example 3.8. An election on candidates C = {a,b,c} having 7 voters of whom 3 have preference
a ≻ b ≻ c, 2 have preference b ≻ a ≻ c and 2 have preference c ≻ b ≻ a corresponds (under the lexico-
graphic order on L(C )) to the anonymous profile (3,0,2,0,0,2)andhence to the point (3/7,0,2/7,0,0,2/7) ∈
∆6.
Remark 3.9. We always consider ∆M as embedded in RM . It is contained in a unique hyperplane
HM , which is given by the single linear equation
∑M
i=1 xi = 1.
We can interpret each anonymous and homogeneous rule as being defined on ∆
Q
M
. If the rule
is also continuous then we can in fact define it on ∆M , which allows us to use our usual geometric
intuition. For example, the domain of S consists of the corners of the simplex, while the domain of
W also lies on the boundary of the simplex (for example,Wa contains all points of the simplex for
whom all coordinates corresponding to rankings with a not at the top are zero).
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The general approach of the last paragraph has been adopted by many previous authors. For
example, Saari [18] simply uses the terminology “profiles" to refer to vote distributions, and all
rules he considers are continuous simplex rules by definition.
3.1. Distance rationalization in the simplex. We shall see in Section 3.2 how anonymous and ho-
mogeneous distance rationalizable rules defined using profiles can be interpreted using the sim-
plex. The converse idea is to define distance rationalizable rules directly on the simplex rather than
on profile space. Wemake the obvious definitions by analogy with those for profiles.
Definition 3.10. Given a fixed candidate set C of size m and a distance on ∆
Q
M
where M = m!, a
partial social rule on ∆
Q
M
of size s with domain D ⊆ ∆
Q
M
is a mapping taking each element of D
to a nonempty subset of Ls(C ). A consensus on ∆
Q
M is a partial social rule that is single-valued at
every point (a partial social function). Given a consensus K and distance δ on ∆
Q
M
, the rule R(K ,δ)
is defined by
(2) R(x)= arg min
r∈Ls (C )
δ(x,Kr ).
The most obvious distances mathematically are surely the ℓp metrics. The interpretation in
terms of social choice is less compelling for p > 1, since we are measuring the amount of effort
needed to change one election into another by transferring vote mass under a nonlinear penalty.
The case p = 1 is by far the most commonly studied, and also arises directly from votewise dis-
tances, unlike the case p > 1.
To our knowledge, several fairly obvious rules of this type have not yet been studied in detail.
Here is an example using the unanimity consensus.
Proposition 3.11. Fix p with 1≤ p ≤∞ and consider the social choice ruleR(Ss ,ℓp ) defined on∆
Q
M .
This rule chooses precisely the initial s-ranking from each of the most frequent ranking(s) from the
input profile.
Proof. Let δ be the ℓp distance on RM and let et denote the basis vector in R
M corresponding to
t ∈ L(C ), a corner of the simplex. Then for x ∈∆M and t , t
′ ∈ L(C ),
δp (x,et )−δ
p (x,et ′)= (1−xt )
p
+
∑
k 6=t
x
p
t − (1−xt ′)
p
−
∑
k 6=t ′
x
p
t ′
= (1−xt )
p
− (1−xt ′ )
p
+x
p
t ′
−x
p
t .
Choosing xt∗ to be the maximum value among the entries of x and setting t = t
∗ shows the right
side of the above expression to be nonpositive for all t ′ 6= t∗. Hence t∗ is a minimizer (the same
argument works for p =∞with a different computation).
Thus if ρ∗ denotes the initial s-ranking corresponding to t∗ (written t∗s = ρ
∗), then for each s-
ranking ρ, we have
δ(x,Ssρ)= min
{t :ts=ρ}
δ(x,et )≥ δ(x,et∗)= δ(x,S
s
ρ∗
).

Remark 3.12. For s =m this rule is the modal ranking rule [2] (the term plurality ranking rule
may seemmore logical, but it is important not to be confused with the ranking induced by plurality
scores of candidates in the case where these scores all differ). For s = 1 it is the social choice variant
of the modal ranking rule, choosing the highest ranked candidate from each modal ranking. Note
that the latter rule differs from plurality rule, which is what we would get if we used the simplex in
dimensionm, as for example done by Saari [18].
In order to findmore interesting rules defined naturally on∆
Q
M
, wemayneed to use less common
distances. For example, so-called statistical distances such as the (asymmetric) Kullback–Leibler
divergence (or relative entropy) and theHellingermetric are heavily used inmany application areas
(the simpler total variation distance arises in Example 3.22 below). We do not present a detailed
study here, deferring it to future work. Instead, we now move on to explore distances on ∆
Q
M in-
duced by distances on E .
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3.2. Quotient distances. We can define a simplex rule by first starting with profiles and passing
to the quotient space, provided the rule in question is anonymous and homogeneous (the case
of Dodgson’s rule R(C,d1K ) which is anonymous but not homogeneous shows that care must be
taken).
Since votewise distances are very natural and the ℓ1 norm is the most obvious choice for a vote-
wise distance (because it just adds the distance from each voter), we obtain several rules with an
ℓ1 flavour in this way. For example, the Hamming metric yields a constant multiple of ℓ1 via the
Wasserstein construction as described in Example 3.22 below, while theKemenymetric and ℓ1 lead
to rules such as Borda and Kemeny’s rule. We discuss ℓ1-votewise rules in more detail in Section 5.
Definition 3.13. A distance is anonymous if d (g (E ),g (E ′)) = d (E ,E ′) for all E ,E ′ ∈ E and all per-
mutations g . An anonymous distance is homogeneous if d (kE ,kE ′)= d (E ,E ′) for all E ,E ′ ∈ E and
all k ≥ 1.
Note that votewise distances need to be normalized before becoming homogeneous, as we ex-
plain in Remark 3.20.
Every anonymous and homogeneous ruleR corresponds to a simplex ruleR. WhenR =R(K ,d )
where both K and d are anonymous and homogeneous, we can express R as R(K ,δ) where K ,δ
depend nicely on K ,d . The mapping from profiles to the simplex yields the obvious consensus
K =K . The distance δ is a little more involved. The obvious idea is to use a quotient distance [4].
This concept is standard but relatively little-known.
Definition 3.14. We define d :∆M ×∆M →R+ to be the quotient distance induced by ∼. That is,
(3) d (x, y)= inf
k∑
i=1
d (Ei ,E
′
i )
where the infimum is taken over all admissible paths, namely paths such that E ′
i
∼ Ei+1 for 1≤ i ≤
k −1, E = E1,E
′ = E ′
k
, E projects to x and E ′ to y.
In general, quotient distances are tricky to work with, owing to the complicated definition. In
our setup, it turns out that they are reasonably tractable.
Proposition 3.15. Let d be an anonymous and homogeneous standard distance on E . Then d is
given by
d(x, y)= inf
E ′
d (E ,E ′)
where E ,E ′ range over all elections having an equal number of voters, such thatD(E )= x,D(E ′)= y.
Proof. Let x, y ∈F and consider an admissible path and its corresponding sum
k∑
i=1
d (Ei ,E
′
i )
where k > 1. We show that we can reduce the value of k . By homogeneity of d , we can change
the size of the voter sets so that Ek and E
′
k−1
have the same sized voter set. Then we can choose
a permutation g of V ∗ taking Ek to E
′
k−1
. Since d is anonymous, using the triangle inequality we
obtain
d (Ek−1,E
′
k−1)+d (Ek ,E
′
k)= d (Ek−1,E
′
k−1)+d (g (Ek ),g (E
′
k ))
= d (Ek−1,E
′
k−1)+d (E
′
k−1,g (E
′
k))
≥ d (Ek−1,g (E
′
k)).
This gives an admissible path with k replaced by k −1.
Thus without loss of generality, in computing d we need only deal with the case k = 1. Finally,
if the minimum is reached for some E = E∗, then for each E we can write g (E∗) = E for some g .
Thus by anonymity d (E ,E ′) = d (E∗,g
−1(E ′)). Thus the minimum can be taken only over E ′, since
g−1(E ′) ranges over all elections as g ranges over all permutations. 
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Remark 3.16. Proposition 3.15 shows that we can replace inf by min, since by anonymity, once we
fix the number of voters there are only a finite number of possible distances d (E ,E ′) to consider.
Proposition 3.17. Let d be an anonymous and homogeneous standard distance on E , and K be
an anonymous and homogeneous consensus. If R =R(K ,δ) is anonymous and homogeneous, then
R =R(K ,d ).
Proof. ByDefinition 2.16,R(E )= argminr∈Ls (C )d (E ,Kr ). ByProposition 3.15, d (x, y)= infE ′ d (E ,E
′),
such thatD(E )= x,D(E ′)= y . In particular, d(D(E ),K r )= infE ′ d (E ,E
′)withE ′ ∈Kr , sod (D(E ),K r )=
d (E ,Kr ). Thus, R(D(E ))=R(E )= argminr∈Ls (C )d (D(E ),K r ) and R =R(K ,d ).

3.3. The ℓp-votewise case — Wasserstein distance. In the special case of ℓp-votewise distances,
we can describe d in more detail using a well-known construction from probability theory, the
Wasserstein distance, which we now recall.
Let S be a finite set of size M , and let ∆(S) denote the set of probability distributions on S. For a
distance d defined on S, the function d
p
W
:∆(S)×∆(S)→R is defined by
d
p
W (x, y)
p
= inf
A
∑
r,r ′∈S
Ar,r ′d (r,r
′)p ,
where the infimum is taken over all couplings of x and y , defined as nonnegative square matrices
of size M whose marginals are x and y respectively (i.e. ∀r,
∑
r ′ Ar r ′ = xr and ∀r
′,
∑
r Ar r ′ = yr ′).
Basically, it represents the minimum cost to move from one configuration to another, where the
underlying distance d defines the cost of eachmovement. Indeed, this construction leads to a new
distance.
Proposition 3.18. If d is a distance on S, then d
p
W
is a distance on ∆(S). If d is a metric, then so is
d
p
W
.
Proof. See [20, Ch. 6]. 
Remark3.19. The function d
p
W
goes by several names, some commonones being the l p-transportation
distance, the Kantorovich p-distance, the p-Wasserstein distance. When p = 1, it is also called the
Earth Mover’s distance or first Mallows metric, and is used heavily in several areas of computer
science, particularly image retrieval and pattern recognition.
Now we are able to make the link with the votewise metrics, by applying the construction of
d
p
W
in the case S = L(C ). Scaling a votewise distance based on the ℓp norm gives a homogeneous
distance with a special formula, and this turns out to be exactly the p-Wasserstein distance.
Remark 3.20. A votewise distance based on ℓp is not homogeneous, as its value depends on the
number of voters. However, we may make an equivalent homogeneous version by scaling. For each
real number p with 1≤ p ≤∞, and each positive integer n, we define a new norm on Rn by defining
for each x ∈Rn
||x||∗p =
1
n
||x||p .
Denote the votewise distance corresponding to this norm by d
p
∗ ; thenR(K ,d
p)=R(K ,d
p
∗ ).
Proposition 3.21. Let d be a finite distance on L(C ). Then d
p
∗ = d
p
W
.
Proof. Write S = L(C ). Since d
p
∗ is anonymous and homogeneous, Proposition 3.15 implies that
d
p
∗ (x, y)=minE ,E ′ d
p
∗ (E ,E
′), where E = x, E ′ = y and |V (E )| = |V (E ′)|. Fix n ≥ 1 and let E = (C ,V ,π)
and E ′ = (C ,V ,π′) denote elections with n voters such that E = x, E ′ = y . Then
d
p
∗ (x, y)
p
=min
π′
1
n
∑
i
d (πi ,π
′
i )
p
≥
1
n
∑
r,r ′∈S
∑
{i :πi=r,π
′
i
=r ′}
d (r,r ′)p =
∑
r,r ′∈S
ar,r ′
n
d (r,r ′)p ,
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where the ar,r ′ ’s are nonnegative integers such that for all r ∈ S,
∑
r
ar,r ′
n = xr and for all r
′ ∈ S,
∑
r ′
ar,r ′
n =
yr ′ , which corresponds to the Wasserstein distance restricted to matrices A respecting the condi-
tions and with coefficients of the form kn with 0 ≤ k ≤ n (in other words, a rational coupling with
restricted denominators). So clearly, d
p
W
(x, y)≤ d
p
∗ (x, y).
Let assume that this inequality is strict. Then there is a coupling A′ (not all of whose entries are
rational) with
∑
r,r ′∈S a
′
r,r ′
d (r,r ′)p + ǫ/2 <
∑
r,r ′∈S ar,r ′d (r,r
′)p for all rational couplings A. However
since maxr,r ′ d (r,r
′) <∞ and we can choose n as large as we want, d
p
W (x, y) can be approximated
arbitrarily closely, since we can approach all entries of A′ simultaneously arbitrarily closely by a
rational matrix satisfying the coupling constraints. This contradiction yields the final result. 
Example 3.22. Let d1 be the ℓ
1 distance between probabilitymeasures on L(C ) and let d = dH . Then
d1∗ =
1
2d1 (also called the total variation distance). This was observed (without the current notation)
in [15, Lemma 3.2]: if E ,E ′ are elections on (C ,V )with |V | = n, then
d1(E ,E ′)≤
2
n
dH (E ,E
′)
and given E ,E ′ ∈∆
Q
M , we can choose n and the preimages E ,E
′ so that equality holds.
Example 3.23. If x ∈ V has 2 “abc voters" ( voters with preferences a ≻ b ≻ c) and 3 bac voters, while
y has 2 bac voters and 3 cba voters, the quotient distance corresponding to the normalized version of
d1H is 3/5. This is because wemust change at least 3 of the 5 voters to convert x to y (switch both abc
voters to cba, and one of the bac voters to cba). For the Kemeny metric d1K , the analogous quantity
is 8/5, because we must make at least 8 swaps of adjacent candidates to convert x to y (switching
abc to cba requires 3 swaps, and switching bac to cba requires 2 swaps; similarly, switching both
abc votes to bac and all three bac to cba requires 8 swaps).
4. TIED SETS AND DECISIVENESS
All social rules used in practice encounter the problem of breaking ties. However, many com-
monly used social rules have the property that the subset of profiles where a unique output is not
determined is “small" (for example asymptotically negligible as n→∞, for fixedm). This is impor-
tant, because if the region where ties occur is small, then ties can be ignored for many purposes,
whereas if that region is asymptotically large, our rule may suffer extreme lack of decisiveness.
In the worst case, the rule may do nothing, and simply return all possible s-rankings at every
profile, making it useless. In the DR framework, this extreme indecision cannot occur, because
some consensus set must be nonempty. However, it is certainly possible to have “large" subsets
of profile space on which a DR rule is not single-valued. We investigate this question for simplex
rules, giving both positive (few ties) and negative (many ties) results.
4.1. Boundaries. We formalize the concept of “tied region" in our geometric context.
Definition 4.1. The boundary of the social rule R is the set of all elections E at which R(E ) is of size
at least 2.
Example 4.2. Suppose thatm = 2, with alternatives a and b,K =C, and d is an anonymous neutral
standard distance. The concepts of majority winner and Condorcet winner coincide when m = 2.
When n is odd, the boundary R(K ,d ) is empty, whereas when n is even, the elections having an
equal number of ab and ba voters are in the boundary.
On the other hand, for the simplex ruleR(C,d), the boundary is the point (1/2,1/2).
Our intuition is that the boundary of a well-behaved simplex rule should be “small" in ∆M , and
be geometrically “nice". The relevant geometric theory is that of Voronoi diagrams. We now digress
to review some known results, which will help develop amore refined intuition.
DISTANCE RATIONALIZATION OF ANONYMOUS AND HOMOGENEOUS VOTING RULES 11
4.2. Geometric background. Voronoi theory is usually defined for a metric space, andmost com-
monly for aMinkowski space (a finite-dimensional real normed vector space). All definitions be-
low work for an arbitrary metric space. The theory can no doubt be generalized to distances, but
we do not deal with maximum generality here. Our main interest is in explaining that there are
several interesting reasons why DR rules defined by ℓp-votewise distances may fail to be decisive.
For a fixed set of of sites (subsets of the entire space), the open Voronoi cell of each site X is
defined as the set of points closer to X than to any other site. The boundaries of these cells are
contained in the union of bisectors, where a bisector of the sites X and Y , denoted β(X ,Y ), is
defined to be the set of points equidistant from those two sites.
Interpreting the sites as the consensus setsKr , we see that the open Voronoi cell corresponding
to Kr is precisely the set on which R(K ,d ) is single-valued with value r . Also, the boundary as
defined above is just the union of boundaries of all Voronoi cells.
We first discuss bisectors, because if these are well-behaved, so will the boundary of the rule be.
We first restrict to the nicest situation (where our intuition is strongest), namely where the space is
Rn under the Euclidean ℓ2 norm. Suppose first that the sites are all distinct points. In this case for
each pair of distinct sites X and Y , the bisector β(X ,Y ) is a hyperplane normal to the line joining
the points. The Voronoi cells are therefore convex polyhedra that tile the entire space.
However, this situation is rather special. In factβ(X ,Y ) is a hyperplane for all X and Y if and only
if the space is indeed Euclidean (in other words the norm is ℓ2) [13]. Thus we should expect to see
bisectors that are not hyperplanes. Of course, such bisectorsmay still bewell-behaved, for example
smooth hypersurfaces. Note that β(X ,Y ) is known to be homeomorphic to a hyperplane provided
the norm is strictly convex (recall that a norm is strictly convex if its unit sphere contains no line
segment) and even sometimes when it is not [9]. This does not preclude nasty behaviour such
as two bisectors intersecting in arbitrarily complicated ways, but for norms defined algebraically,
such as ℓp , that does not happen.
When the sites are not single points (in particular when they are not separated), bisectors may
be poorly behaved even in ℓ2 (see Example 4.4). We conclude that well-behaved bisectors should
not be expected in general, and we explore this in the next section.
4.3. Large boundary. The most obvious way for a rule to be rather indecisive is if the underlying
distance does not distinguish points well. We say that a subset of a Minkowski space (possibly
defined with a seminorm) is large if it contains an open ball, and small otherwise.
Example 4.3. (pseudometric) Consider the Copeland rule whose boundary contains all points with
no unique Copeland winner. This contains in particular the set where all candidates have the same
Copeland score, for example because themajority tournament contains a cycle that includes all can-
didates. This is a large subset of∆M . To see this, note that in terms of coordinates, themajority cycle is
described by
(m
2
)
equations of the form
∑
i∈Sab xi >
∑
i∈Sba xi , where Sab denotes the set of rankings for
which a is above b. The tied set contains a sufficiently small neighborhood of every point for which
all inequalities are strict, because small changes to the proportions of voter types will not change the
majority tournament.
In view of this example, we should require our distances to be quasimetrics. However, there are
other more subtle problems that can occur. Note that in the next example, the distance is ℓ2 and
is hence as nice as could be expected: a metric induced by a norm that is strictly convex, symmet-
ric, and algebraically defined. The problem is that the consensus notion is wrong — intuitively,
consensus sets should be separated, because otherwise how could the consensus choice be un-
controversial?
Example 4.4. (non-separated consensus) Let m = 3 and consider ∆6 with the usual ℓ
2 metric (in-
duced from R5 which coordinatizes H6 in the usual way).
Consider the half-open line segments L1,L2 that join the center P of ∆6 to the points xabc = 1
and xbca = 1 respectively (Figure 4.1 gives some intuition in lower dimension). Each contains the
endpoint on the boundary, but neither contains the center of the simplex.
Define a 1-consensus by lettingKa = L1,Kb = L2 and Kc be the single point xcab = 1. Let H1,H2
be the hyperplanes (in∆6, i.e. having dimension 4) normal to L1,L2 at P. Let S be the set of points in
12 BENJAMINHADJIBEYLI ANDMARK C.WILSON
FIGURE 4.1. Illustration for Example 4.4.
a
bc
∆6 that lie on the other side of H1 from L1 and on the other side of H2 from L2. Then each point of S
lies on the bisector of L1, L2 with respect to the usual ℓ
2 metric d, because the closest point of L1 is P
and this is the closest point of L2. Every point of S that is closer to the centre of ∆6 than to Kc (this
includes the point L1∩L2) is in the boundary of the social choice rule R(K ,d ), which is therefore
large. Note that K satisfies anonymity and homogeneity, but not neutrality. Furthermore, every Kr
is a convex polyhedral subset of the simplex.
If insteadwe defineK symmetrically by lettingKc be the line segment L3 joining the point xcab =
1 to the centre of the simplex, then although the bisectors are large on ∆6, the boundary of the rule is
small. This is because points in S are now closer to L3 than either L1 or L2.
Also note that if the line segments L1 and L2 did not approach arbitrarily closely, the bisectors
would all be small.
Thus we should require that consensus sets be separated. However, there is another common
way in which bisectors can fail to behave well, which is when the underlying norm in a Minkowski
space is not strictly convex. We now analyse a special case of this in some detail.
5. ANALYSIS OF ℓ1-VOTEWISE METRICS
Votewise distances based on the ℓ1 norm are very commonly used. They are typically compu-
tationally easy and have a clear interpretation in terms of adding distances corresponding to each
voter. In fact we are not aware of a named ℓp-votewise rule that has been defined for any p 6= 1.
However, whenwe consider decisiveness, there are some potential negative consequences to using
the ℓ1 norm.
We first show in Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.3 that each ℓ1-votewise metric corresponds
to a (Wasserstein) distance on the simplex that is induced by a norm that is not strictly convex.
Wefix a candidate setC with |C | =m and letM =m! as in previous sections. Let c = (1,1, . . . ,1)/M ∈
RM be the center of the simplex ∆M . Now, we translate the center c to the origin, and we denote
by ∆′ the image of the simplex under this translation. We denote by H the hyperplane containing
∆
′. Our study of the geometry under the Wasserstein distance will be facilitated by the following
observations.
Proposition 5.1. Let d be an ℓ1-votewise distance. Then d induces a norm N on H .
Proof. It is awell knownproperty of theWasserstein 1-distance (thenorm is called theKantorovich-
Rubinstein norm [20, Ch 6]). Explicitly, one first shows that anyWasserstein distance is translation-
invariant. Then one shows that the function f : x 7→ d1W (x+c ,c) is homogeneous on∆
′. Since every
translation-invariant and homogeneous metric is induced by a norm, d induces a norm N on H
by setting N (x)= f (x) on ∆′ and then extending it toH by requiring it to be homogeneous. 
Remark 5.2. This result is not true for the other Wassersteinmetrics, because they do not satisfy the
homogeneity property of norms. For example, let us choose z ∈∆′ such that z1 ≤ 0 and ∀i 6= 1,zi ≥ 0.
It is easy to show that the matrix A reaching the minimum in the definition of d
p
W (x, y) is such that
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Ar r =min(xr , yr ) for all r and thend
p
W
(x, y)= d
p
W
((x−y)+, (y−x)+)where x+ = (max(x1,0), ...max(xn ,0)).
Then d
p
W
(z+c ,c)p = d
p
W
((z1,0, ...0), (0,z2, ...zn))=
∑
r ′ zr ′d (r,r
′)p , andd
p
W
(λz+c ,c)= |λ|
1
p
∑
r ′ zr ′d (r,r
′)p =
|λ|
1
p d
p
W
(z+c ,c).
Proposition 5.3. The norm N of Proposition 5.1 is not strictly convex.
Proof. We need to show that the unit sphere is not strictly convex. Fix a ranking r ∈ L(C ) and con-
sider the subset Sr of all points x ∈H where only the component corresponding to r is negative.
In Sr , we have
N (x)=
∑
r ′
xr ′d (r,r
′).
Thus the equation N (x)= 1 of the unit sphere defines a hyperplane in Sr . Since Sr is large, the unit
ball is not strictly convex. 
We can now show that for any distance d , there are two distinct points whose bisector under the
Wasserstein distance d1W is large.
Proposition 5.4. Consider a norm N induced over H by an ℓ1-votewisemetric. Let r,r1,r2 be rank-
ings. We denote by d1 and d2 the distances d (r,r1) and d (r,r2). Let ǫ > 0. We define x and y as the
two points of H such that xr = −xr1 =
ǫ
d1
, yr = −yr2 =
ǫ
d2
and all other components are equal to
zero. Then, any point z ∈H such that zr ≤ 0 and zr ′ ≥ 0 for all r
′ 6= r is equidistant from x and y
according to N.
Proof. Let z be such a point. Then, x − z and y − z have only one positive component: the one
corresponding to the ranking r . So N (x − z) =
∑
r ′ 6=r (xr ′ − zr ′)d (r,r
′) and N (y − z) =
∑
r ′ 6=r (yr ′ −
zr ′)d (r,r
′). Since the only components (different from r ) where x and y differ are r1 and r2, they
are equidistant from z if and only if (xr1 − zr1)d1+ (xr2 − zr2)d2 = (yr1 − zr1)d1+ (yr2 − zr2 )d2, which
is equivalent to xr1d1+ xr2d2 = yr1d1+ yr2d2, which is in turn equivalent to xr1d1 = yr2d2, which is
true by definition. 
It follows that the behaviour of ℓ1-votewise distances is rather counterintuitive.
Corollary 5.5. Let d be an ℓ1-votewise metric. Then there is a consensus K consisting of isolated
points, such that the boundary of R(K ,d ) is large.
Proof. Write xǫ and yǫ for points x and y of the form defined in Proposition 5.4. That proposition
implies that, if we set Ka = {xǫ} and Kb = {yǫ} and choose a sufficiently small ǫ, then β(Ka ,Kb)
will be large. Also, for any other candidate c , if we set Kc = {xǫc } with ǫ < ǫc , then for any z such
that zr is the only negative component, N (z,Ka)=N (z,Kb)<N (z,Kc ). 
Remark 5.6. Note that the consensus in the proof of Corollary 5.5 is somewhat unnatural. For ex-
ample, it is not neutral and does not intersect the boundary of ∆M .
The next question is how often this kind of situation happens. For simplicity we focus on the
case d = dH , when the induced norm is exactly ℓ
1. We can give an exact characterization of when
two points have a large bisector. This is directly connected with the well-known integer partition
problem.
Proposition 5.7. Let M ≥ 1 and let x, y ∈RM . We denote by S the set of values (xi − yi ). Then x and
y have a large bisector under ℓ1 if and only if there exists a subset S ′ ⊂ S such that
∑
e∈S ′ e =
∑
e 6∈S ′ e.
Proof. By definition β(x, y) = {z|
∑
i |xi − zi | =
∑
i |yi − zi |}. We divide R
M into 4M subspaces cor-
responding to the possible signs of the values (xi − zi ) and (yi − zi ). Let V be one of these sub-
spaces: in V , the equality
∑
i |xi − zi | =
∑
i |yi − zi | is equivalent to
∑
i ǫi (xi − zi ) =
∑
i ǫ
′
i
(yi − zi ),
where ∀i ,ǫi ,ǫ
′
i
=±1. This is equivalent to
∑
i (ǫi −ǫ
′
i
)zi =
∑
i (ǫixi −ǫ
′
i
yi ).
There are two cases. First, if for some i , ǫi 6= ǫ
′
i
, then the linear equation in z is nontrivial and z
lies in a hyperplane, so thatV ∩β(x, y) is small. The other case is when ǫi = ǫ
′
i
for all i , in which case
the left side of the equation is 0. If the right side is nonzero there is no solution, and V ∩β(x, y)=
;. If the right side is zero, then V ∩β(x, y) is large (for each i , it contains all points for which zi
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is sufficiently large, for example). The right side is zero if and only if
∑
i ǫi (xi − yi ) = 0, which is
equivalent to the fact that there exists S ′ ⊂ S,
∑
e∈S ′ e =
∑
e 6∈S ′ e . 
The argument in the proof gives insight into the shape of any large bisector of two points: any
ball included in the bisector is contained in cells where (xi − zi ) and (yi − zi ) are of the same sign,
and thus in a subset defined by a set of equations zi ≤min(xi , yi ) or zi ≥max(xi , yi ) for all i . It
implies, for example, that if the points are corners of the simplex, the large bisector inRM intersects
∆M in a small set. Thus, for example, large boundaries cannot occurwith S (which also follows from
Corollary 6.9 below).
Definition 5.8. The standard decision problem PARTITION is defined as follows. Input is a vector
(z1, . . . ,zM ) of natural numbers. We must decide whether there is a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . ,M } for which∑
i∈S zi =
∑
i 6∈S zi .
Define the decision problem LARGE-BISECTOR as follows. Input is a pair (x, y) of points of QM+
and we must decide whether β(x, y) contains an open ball under the d1H metric.
Remark 5.9. Note that M is part of the input in each case. When M is bounded, PARTITION can be
solved trivially by exhaustive enumeration of subsets. Note that if we let K :=
∑
i xi , then a standard
dynamic programming algorithm solves PARTITION inO(KM ) time.
Proposition 5.10. LARGE-BISECTOR is NP-complete.
Proof. Given an instance (z1, . . . ,zM ) of PARTITION, let xi = zi , yi = 0. This gives an instance of
LARGE-BISECTOR, which is a yes instance if and only if the original instance is a yes instance of
PARTITION. Thus LARGE-BISECTOR is NP-hard. On the other hand, given a yes-instance (x, y,M )
of LARGE-BISECTOR, the criterion in Proposition 5.7 gives a polynomial-sized certificate check-
able in polynomial time, so LARGE-BISECTOR is in NP. Thus, LARGE-BISECTOR is NP-complete.

Remark 5.11. We suspect the analogue of LARGE-BISECTOR to be NP-hard for every ℓ1-votewise
metric. Presumably it is in NP for “nice" distances, but of course there exist distances which cannot
even be computed in polynomial time, so that an analogue of Proposition 5.7 may not exist.
The question of large bisectors is quite subtle, because large bisectors do not occur when the
consensus sets are hyperplanes instead of points.
Proposition 5.12. The bisector of two distinct hyperplanes under any norm on RM is contained in a
union of at most two hyperplanes.
Proof. The distance from a point x to a hyperplane H defined by aT x = b is equal to d (x,H ) =
|aT x−b|
||a||∗
where ∗ denotes the dual norm (see for example [12]; the exact definition is not necessary
here). Now, letH ′ be another hyperplanedefinedby the equation a′T x = b′. We assume that ||a||∗ =
||a′||∗ (without loss of generality since multiplying by a scalar still defines the same hyperplane).
The bisector of H and H ′ can be defined as the set of points x satisfying |aT x−b| = |a′T x−b′|. So,
we have two cases, depending on the sign of these absolute values: either
∑
i (ai −a
′
i
)xi = b−b
′ or∑
i (ai +a
′
i
)xi = b+b
′. Since H 6=H ′, each of these is the equation of a hyperplane. 
6. SMALL BISECTORS AND HYPERPLANE RULES
All our results in this section show that the bisectors in question are contained in a finite union
of hyperplanes. Rules which have a well-defined winner on each component of the complement
in ∆M of a finite set of hyperplanes have been studied recently. Mossel, Procaccia and Racz [15]
call such simplex rules hyperplane rules and show their equivalence with the generalized scoring
rules of Xia and Conitzer [21]. These rules can be defined axiomatically using finite local consis-
tency [22]. Although originally introduced for social choice rules only, the definition extends to
social welfare rules [2] and it is clear that it also extends to general s.
Most rules that have ever been studied by social choice theorists are hyperplane rules. A notable
exception is Copeland’s rule. In order to interpret Copeland’s rule as a hyperplane rule, Mossel,
Procaccia and Racz [15] require that the winner be (arbitrarily) specified on the tied region. This
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seems to us to be stretching the definition too far – we could do the same thing for any indecisive
rule.
We now give a sufficient condition for a DR rule to be a hyperplane rule.
Definition 6.1. Let K be a homogeneous consensus and d a homogeneous distance.
Say that (K ,d ) satisfies the votewise minimizer property (VMP) if the following condition is
satisfied.
There is a mapping ξ : L(C∗)×Ls(C
∗)→ L(C∗) such that for each r ∈ Ls(C
∗) with
Kr 6= ;, and each election E = (C ,V ,π) ∈ E , m(E ,r ) := (C ,V ,ξ(π,r )) minimizes the
distance under d from E toKr , where ξ(π,r ) := (ξ(π1,r ), . . . ,ξ(πn ,r )).
Remark 6.2. The VMP allows us to find a minimizer by dealing with each voter separately, and if
two voters have the same preference order in E then the corresponding votes in m(E ,r ) are equal.
Also if d is votewise based on N, then
d (E ,Kr )=N (d (π1,ξ(π1,r )), . . . ,d (πn ,ξ(πn ,r )).
If N is also symmetric then d (E ,Kr ) depends only on the multiset of all values d (πi ,ξ(πi ,r )).
Proposition 6.3. Let d be ℓp-votewise for some 1≤ p <∞ and suppose that (K ,d ) satisfies the VMP.
Then on ∆M , β(Kr ,Kr ′) is defined by∑
t∈L(C )
xtδ(t ,r )
p
=
∑
t∈L(C )
xtδ(t ,r
′)p .
Proof. The distance between E = (C ,V ,π) and theminimizerm(E ,r )= (C ,V ,π∗) equalsN (Σ) where
Σ is the multiset with entries δ(t ,r ) occurring according to their multiplicities nxt , for all t ∈ L(C ).
The specific form of N then shows that d (E ,m(E ,r ))p = n
(∑
t xtδ(t ,r )
p
)
. Applying the same argu-
ment for r ′ yields the result. 
Definition 6.4. Suppose that the s-consensusK satisfies the following: for each r ∈ Ls(C ), there is a
subset Sr of L(C ) such thatKr consists precisely of those elections for which every voter has a ranking
in Sr . Then we call K a generalized unanimity consensus.
Proposition 6.5. Let d be an ℓp-votewise distance on E and let K be a generalized unanimity con-
sensus. Then (K ,d ) satisfies the VMP.
Proof. If Kr 6= ;, define ξ(πi ) to be the closest element of Sr to πi under the underlying distance
on L(C ) (if there is more than one such element, make an arbitrary choice). For each E = (C ,V ,π),
the element E∗ = (C ,V ,ξ(π)) belongs to Kr . If F = (C ,V ,π
′) ∈Kr then d (E ,F )≥ d (E ,E
∗) because
d (πi ,ξ(πi )) ≤ d (πi ,π
′
i
) for each i , and the ℓp-norm is increasing in each argument in the positive
orthant. Thus E∗ is the desired minimizer. 
Corollary 6.6. (Ss ,dp) satisfies the VMP for every distance d.
Proof. Wecan take Sr to be the set of rankingswhich agree with r in their initial s-ranking, showing
that Ss is a generalized unanimity consensus. 
Example 6.7. Let K =W and d = dK , and N = ℓ
2. For each E = (C ,V ,π) ∈ E and a ∈C, we can take
ξ(π,a) to be the ranking derived from π by swapping a to the top as efficiently as possible in each πi .
Thus d (E ,Wa)
2 =
∑
t∈L(C )n(t )(ξ(t ,a)−1)
2, where n(t ) is the number of times t occurs in π.
Remark 6.8. We do not know of any “natural" consensus and distance which satisfy the VMP, apart
from those already mentioned. We can easily create strange examples, however, by creating general-
ized unanimity consensuses. If for each candidate a we choose a single ranking with a at the top,
this yields a generalized unanimity consensus that is extended byW. Note that this consensus is not
neutral. Alternatively, we could choose all rankings having a in the first or second position (in which
case a is the consensus winner), or b in the first position as long as a is not in the second position (in
which case b is the consensus winner), or c in the first or second position (provided a is not first or
second and b is not first), in which case c is the consensus winner. Again, this is not neutral.
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Corollary 6.9. Suppose that d is ℓp-votewisewith 1≤ p <∞, d is finite and not identically zero, and
K is a generalized unanimity consensus. Then R(K ,d ) is a hyperplane rule.
Proof. Since d <∞we may rearrange the formula in Proposition 6.3 to get
∑
t (δ(t ,r )−δ(t ,r
′))= 0.
It suffices to show that the linear function on the left side is not identically zero. That could only
happen if δ(t ,r ) = δ(t ,r ′) for all t . However, note that the distance from x to Kr is attained at
a point m(x,r ) where m(x,r )t = xt for all t 6∈ S, and d (x,Kr ) =
∑
t∈S xtδ(t ,r )
p . If r 6= r ′ then by
definition Sr 6= Sr ′ . Thus taking t 6∈ S∩S
′, without loss of generality δ(t ,r )= 0 and δ(t ,r ′) 6= 0. 
Corollary 6.10. Every rule of the form R(Ss ,dp), where 1 ≤ p <∞ and d is a distance on L(C ) that
is neither infinite nor identically zero, is a hyperplane rule.
Remark 6.11. This result does not extend to general distances. For example, Copeland’s rule as we
have defined it is not a hyperplane rule, yet it can be defined as R(W,dRT ). Also note that when p =
∞, we do not obtain a hyperplane rule. For example, every point x ∈∆
Q
M for which every coordinate
is nonzero is equidistant from all Sr , soR(S,d
∞) is almost maximally indecisive.
Remark 6.12. Rules of the type described in Proposition 6.3 are rather special. Since the distance to
Kr is of the form
∑
t xtδ(t ,r )
p , each can be thought of as a differently weighted version of the rule
with p = 1.
7. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We now summarize what we have learned about the boundary of a DR simplex rule.
• Using a pseudometric that is not a metric can easily lead to a large boundary.
• Large bisectors can occur even with ℓ2, if consensus sets are not separated.
• Large bisectors can occur with ℓ1-votewise rules, even for consensus sets that are isolated
points, and it can be difficult to determine whether they do occur.
• Even when bisectors are large in the ambient space, using consensus sets on the boundary
of the simplex often yields small bisectors on the simplex.
• Even when bisectors are large on the simplex, neutrality often makes the boundary of the
rule small.
We have seen some desirable properties of consensus sets, such as homogeneity and neutrality.
We argue that convexity (defined in the usual way via restriction from RM ) of each Kr is another
essential condition. In the following example, it seems ridiculous that a should win at the extra
point.
Example 7.1. Consider the case m = 3, and the consensus formed by extending W so that a is the
winner whenever xbca = xcba = 1/2 (and similarly for b,c). This consensus is anonymous and ho-
mogeneous, but Ka ,Kb ,Kc are not convex.
Remark 7.2. In the simplex model, convexity (over Q) is equivalent to the notion of consistency: if
we split the voter set into two parts each of which elects r , the original voter set should elect r . It rules
out the above example. Note that C and Ss are convex. In fact we do not know of a consensus that
has been used in the literature that is not convex.
Based on the above results, we suggest that the following criteria be required of consensus
classes in the simplex (anonymity and homogeneity come for free)
• neutrality
• convexity
• separation
• intersecting the boundary of the simplex
while distances should be required to be metrics.
Note that the separation requirement rules out C as a consensus notion. This may of course be
somewhat controversial. It may turn out that neutral rules based on C and using metrics always
have small boundary (we do not know of a counterexample, but have no proof yet). However, it
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seems strange to consider a situation arbitrarily close to a complete tie among all rankings (the
centre of the simplex) to be an election on which a “consensus" can be formed.
We saw above thatℓ1 votewise distances can lead tomajor problemswith decisiveness. However
there are many natural examples of ℓ1 votewise distances, as we have seen. We do not know of any
“natural" simplex rule satisfying the above requirements for which the boundary is large. However,
not all obvious rules have been thoroughly explored.
Systematic exploration of rules R(K ,d ), where K and d satisfy the recommendations above,
may prove fruitful in finding new rules with desirable properties. For example, by the results in
this paper and [8], the rules R(Ss ,dp) where d is a neutral metric on permutations, are anony-
mous, homogeneous, neutral, continuous, hyperplane rules. There are many neutral (also called
right-invariant) metrics on permutations we have not discussed here, such as the ℓq-metrics (the
cases q = 1,2,∞ being called Spearman’s footrule, Spearman’s rank correlation and the maximum
displacement distance), and the Lee distance [4]. Even the rules R(W,dp ) and R(S,dp) have not
been fully explored, to our knowledge.
Even less understood are rules of the form R(C,ℓp). For example, when p = 1, we obtain a
homogeneous version of the recently described Voter Replacement Rule [5]. Little is known about
the Voter Replacement Rule other than that it is not homogeneous [8].
Beyond the realm of votewise and ℓp distances, we have alreadymentionedmore general statis-
tical distances. Finally, rules involving various matrix norms on the tournamentmatrices have not
been well studied.
Distance-based aggregation of preferences is a more general procedure than we have studied
here: it could be applied with many different input and output spaces [?]. If the input consists of
the tournament matrix rather than the profile, there is a natural hypercube representation of the
input in
(m
2
)
dimensions. Saari & Merlin [19] showed that the Kemeny rule can be described in this
way using distance rationalization with respect to the ℓ1 norm and S. This is the same as using
an elementwise norm on the weighted tournamentmatrix, in our framework. When using profiles
as input, the simplex geometry is hard enough to visualize that some authors have used a fixed
projection to the permutahedron and essentially used S as a consensus. The cases p = 2 (mean
proximity rules) [26, 10] and p = 1 (mediancenter rules) [3] have received attention. These can be
interpreted in our framework by changing the distance — detailed formulaemight be interesting.
A question which partially motivated the present work remains unanswered. Does (a homoge-
nization of) Dodgson’s rule have a “small and nice" boundary? What about other Condorcet rules
R(C,d ) where d is a votewise metric, or even rules based on dT , such as the maximin rule?
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